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This paper studies the interactions between the structure of product demand, relative wages, 
and the allocation of economic activity across two sectors. The agrarian sector produces a 
homogeneous good and consists of informal firms employing adults and children. The 
modern sector produces a quality-differentiated product: high-quality varieties are produced 
by formal firms which employ only adult labour, whereas low-quality varieties are produced 
by informal firms which employ child labour as well. Differences in tastes and incomes 
across households generate demand for both high-quality varieties and the low-quality 
varieties. We find that stricter enforcement of child-labour regulations and increases in 
minimum wages can have beneficial effects as far as the incidence of child labour and the size 
of the formal sector are concerned. However, since these policies have undesirable welfare 
effects among segments of wage-earning households, they may not garner the necessary 
political support. 
JEL-Code: O110, O170, E260. 
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1. Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to use some important building blocks of the literature on 
child labour and the informal economy to develop a model which uncovers some new 
channels through which some widely discussed policy interventions in the child labour 
literature can be analysed. The distinguishing feature of our approach is the interaction 
between  the  structure  of  product  demand,  relative  wages,  and  the  allocation  of 
economic activity across the formal and informal sectors. 
The  incidence  of  child  labour  has  been  recognised  as  one  of  the  most  pressing 
economic and social issues in developing countries; e.g. ILO‘s (1973) Convention on 
the  Minimum  Age  for  admission  to  Employment  and  Work.  This  recognition  was 
followed by a number of international initiatives and policy interventions. These took 
many  forms,  and  they  ranged  from  information  campaigns,  to  income  replacement 
programs,  flexible  schooling  programs,  reintegration  projects,  restrictions  on 
employment, and conditional cash transfers. The information campaigns include the 
World  Day  against  Child  Labour  (set  on  June  12),  labeling  campaigns  such  as 
Rugmark, whichlabels hand-knit carpets as ―child labour free‖, and the "Red Card" 
which takes place during international football competitions to inform the public on 
child  labour  issues  with  the  aim  of  fostering  the  emergence  of  a  world  movement 
against  child  labour.  Among  the  policy  initiatives  are  conditional  cash  transfer 
programssuch  as  Brazil‘s  PETI  (Programme  for  the  Eradication  of  Child  Labour), 
whose  main  feature  is  the  after-school  programme,  Jornada  Ampliada,  which  is 
obligatory for children benefiting from the grant. The basic idea is to help reduce child 
labour by simply keeping the children at school twice as long, thereby limiting the time 
available for work (ILO, 2006). 
 
At the same time the economic literature was making great strides in understanding the 
causes and consequences of child labour as well as alerting policymakers to the dangers 
of bland policy interventions. Following on the influential contributions of Basu and 
Van (1998), and Baland and Robinson (2000), the research effort has been extended in 
various directions. The causes and consequences of child labour have been analysed, 
inter alia, in relation to: minimum wage legislation and labour standards (e.g. Maskus 
(1997), Basu (2000); trade and globalization (Ranjan, 2001; Jafarey and Lahiri, 2002;   3 
Edmonds and Pavnik, 2005; Dinopoulos and Zhao, 2007); fertility and human capital 
accumulation(Chaudhuri, 2000; Fan, 2002; Brown et al., 2002; Doepke and Zilibotti, 
2005); and income distribution (Swinnerton and Rogers, 1999; Rogers and Swinnerton, 
2004).  
One characteristic of child labour is the fact that the phenomenon of child labour is 
stronger in countries with large informal sectors. In most developing economies the 
contribution of the informal sector to the national income is very important, and child 
labour occurs almost exclusively in the informal sector – usually, in simple units with 
simple technology and little capital equipment (Galli, 2001). Most influential studies in 
the child labour literature do not take into account the interactions between child labour 
and the allocation of economic activity between the formal and informal sectors. In the 
few studies that explicitly take account of the informal sector, it is assumed that it 
employs  only  children  and  produces  either  an  identical  good  as  the  formal  sector 
(Dessy,  2000;  Dessy  &  Pallage,  2001),  or  produces  an  intermediate  good  used  by 
formal-sector firms  to  produce the single final  good (Maskus,  1997). However, the 
assumption that the informal sector employs only child labour is hardly convincing 
given the large size of informal output in many developing countries. Moreover, such a 
setting does not allow for (adult) inter-sectoral labour mobility between the formal and 
informal sectors, and it underestimates the role of informal sector trap in the incidence 
of child labor. 
However, there are studies (e.g., Jafarey and Lahiri, 2002; Dinopoulos and Zhao, 2007) 
that do take into account the interactions between child labour and the inter-sectoral 
allocation of economic activity. (Although the authors do not explicitly model one of 
the  sectors  as  the  informal  sector,  one  could  one  could  easily  attach  such  an 
interpretation to their models.) These studies have been concerned with the effects of 
trade sanctions and globalization on the incidence of child labour. Jafarey and Lahiri 
(2002)  have  constructed  a  two-sector  model  in  which  the  existence  of  borrowing 
constraints  interacts  with  educational  choices.  Children  and  unskilled  adults  are 
employed in the production of the export good, while skilled adults (which children can 
become after receiving education) produce the imported good. The authors find that 
trade sanctions -which reduce the relative wages of unskilled – can lead to an increased 
supply of child labour, and that the possibility of such an outcome increases with the   4 
severity of credit constraints. The reason for this outcome is that a reduction of the 
incomes of very poor families (headed by unskilled workers) induces credit constrained 
parents to increase the amount of time spent by their children in labour and reduce that 
spent on education. Thus, the incidence of child labour in this model is shaped by 
factors influencing the supply of child workers.  
 
In contrast, in the model developed by Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007) the focus is on the 
demand determinants of child labour – the supply of child labour is exogenous. They 
have constructed a specific-factors model of a small open economy, in which three 
factors (skilled and unskilled adult labour and child labour) produce two homogeneous 
goods. The first good is produced in the ―modern‖ sector, using sector-specific capital 
and skilled adult labor. The second good is produced in the ―agrarian‖ sector, using 
skilled labour and unskilled (child and adult) labour. Efficiency wages  are used by 
firms in the modern sector to induce higher effort and labour productivity, whereas the 
agrarian sector firms offer nutritional efficiency wages to child labourers. This set up 
allows the authors to examine the effects of various trade and domestic policies on the 
incidence of child labour by taking into account the influence that these policies may 
have on the inter-sectoral allocation of economic activity. This is important for the 
incidence  of  child  labour  since,  by  assumption,  children  are  employed  only  in  the 
agrarian sector. 
 
In the present paper we analyze further the demand-side determinants of child labour, 
especially its interaction with the informal sector. For this purpose, we find that the 
assumption that child labour is concentrated only in one sector (agrarian) is restrictive. 
After all, many children are employed in developing-world cities not only as street 
vendors  and  shoe  polishers  but  in  manufacturing,  construction,  and  trade-related 
activities as well. For example, Edmonds (2007) reports that in some countries (e.g. 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey) there are more children employed in manufacturing than 
in agriculture, forestry and fishing, while in most countries the manufacturing sector 
remains a significant part of the total employment of children. (Adding the children 
employed in construction, hotels, restaurants, and trade-related activities, makes the 
number  of  children  employed  in  non-agrarian  activities  even  a  more  important 
component  of  total  child  employment).  Another  important  characteristic  of  non-
agrarian sector child labour is that it is concentrated in the informal sector. According   5 
to ILO (2006), ―most children work in the informal sector, without legal or regulatory 
protection‖.  Buchmann  (2000)  points  out  that  in  addition  to  laws  limiting  the 
employment of children in the formal sector,
1 there are other factors minimizing the 
number of children working in formal workplaces, such as the presence of adult trade 
unions and the relatively high education, skill and physical strength demanded by most 
formal-sector employers. 
 
In order to  capture these aspects,  we  consider  a closed economy consisting of two 
perfectly  competitive sectors. One of them produces  a homogeneous  good, and the 
other produces a vertically- differentiated product. We identify the homogeneous-good 
sector  with  agriculture,  and  assume  that  its  output  is  produced  by  informal  firms 
employing  adult  and  child  workers.  The  production  of  the  vertically-differentiated 
product is segmented according to quality: high-quality varieties are produced by firms 
in  the  formal  sector,  whereas  low-quality  varieties  are  produced  by  informal-sector 
firms. This assumption is based on the ―quality dualism‖ framework of Banerji and Jain 
(2007). They argue that in many developing countries, while (urban) informal firms 
produce goods and services that are also produced by formal firms, there is a quality 
gap  between  the  outputs  of  two  sectors,  with  formal  firms  having  comparative 
advantage  in  the  high-quality  variety  and  the  informal  firms  in  the  low-quality 
substitute.  Although  Banerji  and  Jain  (2007)  abstain  from  child  labour  issues,  we 
introduce them by assuming that formal firms employ only adult labour, while informal 
firms employ both adult and child labour. Thus the model involves three ―sectors‖: an 
urban formal sector producing the high-quality variety of the vertically-differentiated 
product, and two informal sectors – one of which is producing the low-quality variety 
of the vertically-differentiated product, and the other being the agrarian sector. 
 
Our stronger connection with the child labour literature comes from following Basu and 
Van‘s (1998) strong connection between family living standards and child labour: the 
leisure of children is treated as a luxury good, which parents cannot provide at low 
                                                 
1 In many countries these laws are not vigorously enforced. For example, the Venezuelan National 
Children's  Institute  calculated  that  the  formal  sector  employs  almost  20 percent  of  child  labourers 
(UNICEF, 1996).   6 
level  of  income  (the  luxury  axiom).
2  Following  Emerson  and  Souza  (2003)  w e 
introduce a simplified static versi on of the dynamic child labour trap (the  informal 
sector trap). In our model, adults working in the informal (urban or agrarian) sectors  
receive  the  market  clearing  wage  and  send  their  children  to  work,  whereas  those 
working in the formal sector receive a binding minimum wage and can afford to send 
their  children  to  school.  This  supply  structure  is  complemented  with  a  preference 
structure which, due to differences in tastes and income across households, generates 
demand for both the high-quality variety produced by formal firms, and the low-quality 
variety produced by informal firms.  
 
We focus on the effects of two policy interventions: a stricter enforcement of child 
labor regulations (CLR) and changes in the level of the minimum wage. We note that 
the most common policy prescription with regard to child labor issues is the imposition 
of a ban on child labour. The desirability of this policy is contested in the theoretical 
literature  (Soares,  2010).  For  example,  banning  child  labour  could  be  an  efficient 
interventionist benign policy in economies with multiple equilibria, while in the case of 
a unique equilibrium (which is most likely in poor countries) it can result in a rise in 
child employment(e.g., to Basu and Van, 1998; Dessy and Pallage, 2001). Moreover, 
there is no available empirical evidence from low income countries on its effectiveness 
(Edmonds, 2007). 
We examine the policy implications of a tighter enforcement of CLR since this is a 
more realistic policy scenario than a total ban in the context of developing economies 
(due to high social and monitoring costs). Our results suggest that a more regulated 
child labor market could be desirable; it can reduce both the employment of children 
and  it  can  increase  the  welfare  of  households  working  in  the  informal  sector.  The 
explanation of our results lies on the switch in demand from low-quality and informal-
sector produced varieties to high-quality, formal-sector produced varieties that a stricter 
enforcement of child labour regulation generates. In our model, stricter enforcement 
decreases child labour supply, thus inducing an increase in informal sector wages (of 
                                                 
2Basu  and  Van  (1998)  are  able  to  generate  multiple  equilibria  in  their  model:  there  exists  a  ―bad‖ 
equilibrium where child labour emerges and the adult wages are too low and a ―good‖ equilibrium where 
there is no child labour and adult wages are high. We preclude the emergence of multiple equilibria.   
 
   7 
both adults and children) and in the price of the low-quality good. This in turn switches 
household demand towards the high quality good (formal sector), implying a ―demand-
pull‖ reallocation of economic activity from the informal to the formal sector. As a 
result, child employment is reduced, a higher proportion of households are paid at the 
minimum wage, and the market-clearing wage is increased.  
Nevertheless, the policy harms some segments of the population. Adults, who were 
working in the formal sector before stricter CLR was enforced, and which continue to 
consume the low-quality VDP, will experience a fall in welfare as the price of the low-
quality variety will increase due to the rise in the informal sector‘s wage. The same will 
also  be  true  for  all  households  remaining  in  the  informal  sector  since  the  rise  in 
informal wages will be offset not only by the commensurate rise in the price of the low-
quality variety, but also by the child‘s labour supply. These adverse consequences of 
stricter enforcement of CLR, explains why the politico-economic equilibrium in many 
countries is not conducive to their implementation. (However, in section 4, we discuss 
some ways in which the implementation of stricter CLR can ameliorate some of these 
effects). 
Although  the  use  of  the  minimum  wage  as  a  policy  instrument  to  achieve  desired 
distributional  goals  has  been  widely  discussed  in  the  informal  sector  literature 
(Fizsbein, 1992; Sagat 2001; Bird and Manning 2002; Lemos, 2004), it has received 
only  scant  attention  in  the  child  labour  research  field.  One  important  exception  is 
Basu‘s  (2000)  paper.  He  shows  that  the  common  presumption  that  a  rise  in  the 
minimum wage will reduce child labour supply (since households will be less poverty-
constrained, and thus prefer to send their children to school -i.e. the luxury axiom) may 
not  always  hold.  .Our  model  identifies  a  mechanism  that  may  run  in  the  opposite 
direction. We argue that an income effect generated by an increase of the minimum 
wage may differentiate the policy outcomes. The intuition behind these results is simple 
and  –  though  formally  different  –  follows  Fizsbein‘s  (1992)  demand  approach:  as 
formal-sector  households  become  richer,  they  may  switch  their  demand  toward  the 
high-quality variety. The subsequent expansion of formal economic activity may induce 
positive outcomes concerning not only a reduction in children‘s employment (as formal 
employment increases, fewer parents send their children to work) but also due to rising 
wages in the informal sector. Although one can not be certain whether the channel   8 
identified by Basu (2000) is empirically stronger than the one identified here, we note 
that the limited empirical evidence with have in this regard does not contradict our 
result. For example, Wahba (2006) finds that in Egypt, a 10% increase in the illiterate 
male market wage decreases the probability of child labour by 22% for boys and 13% 
for girls. Given the strong positive correlation that exists in the data between minimum 




In the rest of the paper we first lay out the model, and then we proceed with the policy 
analysis. In addition to the effects of stricter enforcement of child labour regulations 
and increases in minimum wages, we also examine the effects of changes in the 
productivity of the agrarian sector, and of changes in labour supply. 
 
2. The model 
We  consider  the  case  of  a  small  closed  economy  consisting  of  two  perfectly 
competitive  sectors.  One  of  them  produces  a  homogeneous  good,  and  the  other 
produces a vertically-differentiated product. We identify the homogeneous-good sector 
with agriculture, and assume that its output is produced by informal firms employing 
adult and child workers. The production of the vertically-differentiated product (VDP) 
is segmented according to quality: high-quality varieties are produced by formal firms 
(indexed by F), whereas low-quality varieties are produced by informal firms (indexed 
by IN) employing both adults and children. For ease of exposition in what follows we 
refer to the sector producing the vertically-differentiated product (VDP) as the modern 
sector, and the agricultural sector as the agrarian sector. We will reserve the adjective 
―informal‖ only for (that subset of) modern-sector firms, with the understanding that all 
producers in the agrarian sector are informal.  
 
2.1 Supply relationships 
2.1.1 Agrarian Sector 
The agrarian good is produced with the use of labour and of a factor in fixed supply. 
The factor in fixed supply is provided by landowners (e.g. land), and we normalize its 
supply  to  unity.  The  labour  used  by  the  agrarian  sector  is  denoted  by A L ,  and  it 
                                                 
3However, this evidence can be consistent with Basu‘s (2000) model as well.    9 
represents the labour provided by adult and child workers in effective terms. Following 
standard practice in the literature (e.g. Basu and Van, 1998; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005; 
Dinopoulos  and  Zhao,  2007)  we  assume  that  child  workers  can  do  whatever  adult 
workers can do, but their productivity is only a fraction b (0<b<1) of adult workers‘ 
productivity. This assumption implies that unless adult and child workers are paid the 
same wage rate per effective unit of labour, agrarian sector producers will not employ 
both types of workers. We thus assume that if adult workers‘ wage rate is IN W , children 
receive a wage rate C W , such that 
IN C bW W  .                                                                                                                    (1) 
The agrarian sector‘s production function is:  
A A BL
   .                                                                                                                       (2) 
Parameter α  01   indicates the presence of diminishing returns, and B is an index 
of agrarian-sector productivity. Using the agrarian good as the numeraire (PA=1), the 
profit-maximizing demand for effective units of labour is  
1
IN A W BL
 
  .                                                                                                                 (3) 
The resulting aggregate profits of the sector are equal to:  
  1 AA BL
   .                                                                                                            (4) 
We assume that profits are equally distributed among the landowners, whose number is 
equal to T. 
 
2.1.2 The Modern Sector 
The modern sector is essentially made up of two distinct sub-sectors: the formal sector 
and the informal sector. What distinguishes the two sectors is that the formal sector 
produces a high-quality variety of the VDP, whereas the informal sector produces a 
low-quality  variety.  The  VDP  is  produced  with  the  use  of  labour  only.  Quality  is 
measured by an index Q, and there is complete information regarding the quality index. 
We  assume  that  there  exists  a  ―cottage‖  technology  which  is  available  to  all  for 
producing low-quality varieties of the VDP, and a modern technology which allows the 
production  of  high-quality  varieties.  Low-quality  varieties  are  defined  as  those  for 
whichQQ  , whereas high-quality varieties are identified withQQ  . Firms that have 
access to the technology which allows the production of high-quality varieties belong to 
the formal sector, whereas the rest of the firms are informal. We may think that the   10 
production technology is such that formal firms have access to excludable public inputs 
which allows them to produce the high quality good at lower cost than informal firms 
(e.g., access to electricity at subsidized prices). Moreover, this categorization of firms is 
motivated by the fact that consumers of high-quality, high-priced items are more likely 
to demand after-sales services (guarantees, repairs, etc) to which only formal sector 
firms can credibly commit to (and be legally responsible).  
 
In order to have informal firms able to produce the low-quality variety at a lower cost 
than formal firms, we need to assume that the difference in productivity between formal 
and informal producers is small when quality is low - since then any wage advantage of 
informal  firms  (explained  below)  could  offset  their  productivity  disadvantage  (see, 
Flam and Helpman, 1987; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1997; Malley and Moutos, 2001, for 
applications  of  this  idea  in  the  context  of  international  trade).  As  long  as  this 
productivity disadvantage of the informal producers gets larger as quality increases, 
there will be a quality threshold after which formal producers will have lower costs 
than informal ones. Our assumption that the modern technology is available only to a 
subset of firms provides a stark manifestation of this idea.
4 
 
This simple formulation adopted here, captures two fundamental features of a typical 
dual developing economy regarding (i) the quality gap between sectors and (ii) the 
limited access of  the informal sector to public services.   These features have been 
extensively documented in the literature. Banerji and Jain (2007) quote many studies 
documenting the existence of quality gaps: for example, Myint (1985) claims that 
typical  features  of  developing  countries  are  ―…  large  factories  producing  more 
expensive and better quality products and small handicraft industries producing cheaper 
and  lower  quality  products‖,  whereas  Livingstone  (1991)  in  his  discussion  of  the 
informal sector in Kenya, says that ―… in a market dominated quantitatively by low-
income consumers, [informal sector producers] offer cheap and ‗appropriate‘ goods.‖ 
The  goods  and  services  consumed  by  low-income  consumers  ―…  serve  similar 
purposes at a much lower price - informal sector taxis, local beer instead of canned beer 
… and less hygienic eating houses and food kiosks instead of modern hotels.‖ The lack 
                                                 
4Rausch (1991) was the first to formalize the idea that the inferior technological capability of informal 
firms is the reason for their inability to compete on an equal footing with formal firms, thus forcing 
them to operate in the informal  sector  where the ability to avoid some costs related to regulation 
(taxation, minimum wages) allows them to survive.    11 
of access by the informal sector to public services is particularly acute with respect to 
the legal and judicial system and the police, as well as to the capital markets since 
informal businessmen cannot exercise full property rights over their capital and product 
(Loayza, 1996), an implication of which is a rise in the cost of their capital (De Paula 
and Scheinkman, 2011).  
 
The high-quality variety is produced (in the formal sector) by adult workers only. This 
assumption  may  be  thought  of  in  two  ways.  First,  as  a  direct  consequence  of  our 
definition of formality; i.e. formal firms obey all regulations – including the (albeit lax) 
regulations against child labour. Second, and more importantly, as an expression of the 
idea  that  higher  quality  goods  require  more  human  capital,  which  adults  have  but 
children lack (e.g., Copeland and Kotwal, 1996; Banerji and Jain, 2007). In contrast, 
low-quality  varieties  can  be  thought  of  as  being  produced  with  a  standardized 
technology which does not require much human capital; thus, for informal firms we 
make use of the substitution axiom of Basu and Van (1998), and we assume that both 
adult and child workers are employed, and that they are (perfectly) substitutable in the 
same way as in the agrarian sector.  
 
Formal firms face labour market regulation not only with respect to the non-use of child 
workers, but also with respect to having to pay a (binding) minimum wage WM. (Note 
that a legally binding minimum wage, which is independent of the age of the worker, is 
another reason why formal firms would not be willing to hire the lower-productivity 
child workers.) In addition to labour market regulations, formal firms have to incur a 
cost,  F,  per  physical  unit  of  output.  We  may  think  of  this  cost  as  the  ―price  of 
formality‖, and it can represent either the burden of various taxes
5 imposed on formal 
firms, or the costs of complying with various environmental, health, or work-safety 
regulations.
6 Informal firms do not comply with any of the above regulat ions, and pay 
                                                 
5We abstain from any explicit treatment of issues relating to the government budget constraint. In 
principle, we could have the government use its tax proceeds to finance various cash-transfer programs 
to households which are conditional on school attendance.   
6We may think that  M W  and F  are indexed (or, linearly related) to the price of the homogeneous (the 
numeraire) good. The indexation of the minimum wage on the price of the agrarian good can be due to 
explicit  or  implicit  government-set  indexation  schemes,  e.g.,  MA WP   ;  we  abstain  from  a 
consideration of the process by which the minimum wage is set, and we will simply consider changes 
in  M W  as resulting from changes in the indexation parameter  .    12 
their workers the market-clearing wage rate - WIN and bWIN, for adult and child workers, 
respectively. We assume that the minimum wage rate, WM, is higher than the informal 
wage rate, WIN <WM.  
 
Following  Flam  and  Helpman  (1987)  and  Banerji  and  Jain  (2007)  we  assume  that 
average costs depend on quality and that, for any given quality level, average cost is 
independent  of  the  number  of  physical  units  produced.  We  write  the  average  cost 
functions (as functions of quality) for formal and informal firms as, 
    F Q W Q P Q AV F M F F                                                                                         (5) 
    IN IN IN IN Q W Q P Q AV                                                                                            (6) 
with     IN F Q P Q P   given that  IN M W W   and  F IN QQ .  
This  specification  of  average  costs  implies  that  as  quality  increases,  more  units  of 
labour are required to produce each physical unit of the VDP product. This assumption 
is consistent with the fact that increases in quality – for a given state of technological 
capability – involve the employment of a larger number of personnel not only for the 
production of a higher number of features attached to each good that directly absorb 
labour, but also to the development and refinement of these features as well.  
 
2.2 Households 
The economy is populated by a fixed number of landowners (T) and identical working 
households (L). Each household consists of one adult member and one child. All adult 
members are endowed with one unit of effective labour, which they offer inelastically
7. 
Children are endowed with b  1  b  units of effective labour. We follow the literature‘s 
standard assumptions about the altruistic and paternalistic behavior of the household 
(e.g. Basu and Van, 1998; Baland and Robinson, 2000), i.e., we assume that the adult 
member makes all the economic decisions including the time allocation decision for the 
child. Following the luxury axiom, the working households are distinguished into two 
categories  regarding  their  wage  incomes  and  their  subsequent  decisions  on  child 
employment. Adult members who are engaged in the formal sector and paid at the 
binding minimum wage (WM) can afford to send their children to school or keep them at 
                                                 
7Although there is no empirical evidence on the elasticity of labour supply in developing countries, the 
assumption that is inelastic seems reasonable for these economies which are characterized by the lack 
of social security nets and the widespread poverty.   13 
home.  On  the  other  hand,  adult  members  who  work  either  in  the  informal  or  the 
agrarian sector and earn the competitive wage (WIN) are forced to consider sending their 
children to work. Thus, the minimum wage in our setting plays the same role as the 
subsistence level of Basu and Van (1998). The assumptions that the minimum wage 
level (fixed by the government) can guarantee the basic goods basket to formal workers 
while the wage gap is large enough meaning that the fully flexible wage cannot satisfy 
even the subsistence needs of informal/agricultural households are consistent with the 
empirical  evidence  in  developing  economies
8. For simplicity we assume that the 
landowning households do not supply any labor, neither adult nor child.  
 
Given our desire to focus on demand issues, we abstain from a full treatment of child 
labour supply decisions and we simply assume that the economy is subject to a child 
labor regulation (CLR) whose level of strictness    1 , 0  s  affects directly aggregate 
child labor supply, which, in effective terms is equal to (1-s b. The case of a complete 
enforcement of a ban on child labor applies when 1 s  . This implies that if CLR is 
strict and well enforced the effective labor force participation of children would be 
small. This interpretation of CLR implicitly places the burden of complying with the 
regulation on households rather than firms (see, Basu, 2000, for an analysis of the 
case in which firms are fined for employing children). We may think of various ways 
in which households may be induced to comply with CLR. An indirect way to make 
households comply is to make school attendance (up to a certain age) obligatory and 
use various incentive/discipline schemes to induce parents to send their children to 
school. Providing free school meals, and in-school medical care and medicines is one 
way to do this.The Mid-Day Meal Scheme in India involves millions of families who 
can feed their children by sending them to school, and keeping them out of child 
labour Vermeersch and Kremer (2005) have evaluated a program providing meals to 
children attending preschool in Kenya. They found that school participation was 30 
percent greater in schools with a free breakfast, than in comparison schools without 
free breakfast. Making the provision of vital social services to households dependent 
on school attendance is another way. Examples of such programs are the PROGRESA 
                                                 
8 A set of comparative workforce development studies in five countries – Egypt, El Salvador, India, 
Russia and South Africa provide useful data on the wage gap between sectors (NALEDI, 2003). El 
Mahdi  and  Amer  (2004),  result  in  a  large  gap  between  formal  and  informal  real  wages  in  Egypt 
measured at two points in time (1988 and 1998) and for both sexes.   14 
programme in Mexico, theProgram Familias en Acción in Colombia, and the PRAF 
in  Honduras,  which  offer  cash  transfers,  nutritional  supplements,  and  preventive 
health care  as  well as  educational  programs  about  health and  hygiene  conditional 
upon school attendance. 
 
Attending school does not prevent children from working after-school hours, but it does 
reduce  the  hours  that  they  can  work.  Moreover,  if  school  attendance  is  not  only 
obligatory up to a certain age but also until a child achieves the learning required by 
each level of education (e.g., elementary school), devoting most of the child‘s after-
school hours to work may imply that the child has to stay in school for more years, thus 
reducing  the  child‘s  lifetime  labour  supply.  The  diligence  with  which  teachers  and 
school inspectors are expected to carry their duties will be a key determinant of the 
effect of such policies on child labour supply.
9  We summarize the influence of all the 
above named factors in the variable s.  
 
Following Flam and Helpman (1987) we treat the homogeneous good as being divisible, 
while the VDP is assumed to be indivisible and households can consume only one unit 
of it. A convenient characterization of household preferences over the consumption of 
goods (for either landowners or working households) is given by the following utility 
function for household i: 
ln ln i i i U Q A    .                                                                                                        (7) 
In equation (7), Q stands for the quality (either QF or QIN) level of the VDP, Ai is the 
quantity  of  the  homogeneous  good  (agricultural)  consumed  by  agent  i  and  θi  is  a 
parameter which differentiates the intensity of preferences among households for the 
quality level of the VDP.  
 
In order to be able to examine the incidence of various policies on child labor and 
informality while at the same time to be consistent with the empirical observations on 
the economic environment of developing economies (regarding the large wage gap), we 
formulate the purchasing behavior as follows: We assume that all households working 
in the informal /agrarian sectors have the same preferences, with taste parameter  1 IN  
                                                 
9Changes in the obligatory years of education (e.g., from 6 to 9 years) or in the level of educational 
achievement that a child must achieve (e.g., elementary school graduate) can also affect the number of 
hours/years that children work.   15 
and always decide to consume the low-quality, informally-produced, VDP (QIN). The 
budget constraint of these households is,  
    1 IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN Y W b s W A P Q A W Q        ,where,  IN Y  is the income of the 
household, consisting of the adult‘s wage, WIN, and the child‘s wage income, (1-s)bWIN , 
IN A is the consumption of the homogeneous good, and WINQIN is the price of the low-
quality  variety  offered  by  informal  firms.  Given  the  above  preferences  the  utility 
maximizing demand for the homogeneous good  IN A  is  
  1 IN IN IN IN IN A W b s W W Q      .                                                                                 (8) 
 
Figure 1 displays the choices of a household receiving the informal wage. The two 
quality levels of the VDP are depicted on the horizontal axis, and the quantity of the 
homogeneous good (as well as household income given that 1 A P  ) is depicted on the 
vertical axis. The household‘s income determines the budget constraint, which, since 
only two quality levels of the VDP are available, comprises just of points 1 and 2. 

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Low-income households select between these points the one giving them the highest 
utility,  which  in  Figure  1  is  point  1  -  the  one  associated  with  consumption  of  the 
informally-produced, low-quality variety of the VDP.  
 
For households earning the minimum wage we assume that there are differences in their 
intensity of preferences over the quality level, implying the willingness to pay for the 
high quality QF. For this income group we assume that the taste parameter is distributed 
according to a continuous uniform distribution in the interval   , 1  and its cumulative 
density function is given by:  
                 0               for     θ<1 





        for        1                                                                                 (9) 
                  1             for       θ>γ 
For simplicity, and without much loss of generality, in what follows we assume that 
changes in the employment status of households will be associated with changes in 
their  preference  structure;  i.e.,  households  switching  from  informal  to  formal 
employment will acquire the preference traits (through peer pressure or social osmosis) 
of formal-sector households.  
 
In Figure 1 we depict the formal-sector households with income () FM YW  ; their budget 
constraint  comprises  of  points 3  and 4.  Among these households, the one with  the 
highest value of     , has a map of "steep" indifference curves (one of which is 
denoted by  ) and achieves maximum utility by consuming bundle 4. As a result, 
the utility maximizing demand for the homogeneous good is,  
   
H
F M F M M F A W P Q W W Q F      .                                                                     (10) 
To ensure that this household purchases both goods, we assume that (1 ) MF W Q F  , 
which can be the case only if  F Q <1. In contrast, the household with the lowest value of 
θ, is represented by indifference curve θ=1, and chooses to consume bundle 3, i.e., the 




F M IN M IN IN A W P Q W W Q      .                                                                          (11) 
                                                 
10Note that no further restrictions are required to ensure positive demands for both goods in this case.   17 
Note that no further restrictions are required to ensure positive demands for both goods.  
Equations  (10)  and  (11)  imply  that  for  a  formal-sector  household  with i   ,  the 
indirect utility function takes the form:  
  ln ln
H
F i F M M F V Q W W Q F      ,   if it consumes the high-quality good             (12) 
  ln ln
L
F i IN M IN IN V Q W W Q     ,          if it consumes the low-quality good              (13) 
 
Let 
*  denote the value of θfor which a household is indifferent between consuming 
one unit of quality QF at price PF and one unit of quality QIN at price PIN. For this 
household it must hold that, ( , ) ( , )
HL
F M F F M IN V W Q V W Q  , which implies: 
   
** ln ln ln ln F M M F IN M IN IN Q W W Q F Q W W Q                                             (14) 
Solving equation (14) for θ* we find,   
   
IN F
F M M IN IN M
Q Q




   
 
                                                          
(15) 
A  formal-sector  household  with 
*    is  depicted  in  Figure  1  as  possessing  the 
indifference curve passing from points 3 and 4. 
 
Using the specification  of the uniform  distribution adopted above, we find that the 
number of formal-sector households which consume the high-quality variety (i.e., those 
with












, where LF is adult employment (in both absolute 
and efficiency units) in the formal sector.   
 
By assumption, landowners earn more than minimum-wage earners, so that they always 
choose to consume the high quality good produced in formal sector, implying that the 
consumption of homogeneous good  T A given by 
     
1 A A
T F M F
BL
A P Q W Q F
TT
   
     ,                                                          (16) 
where   1 A BL
T
  
 is the profits accruing to each of the T landowners.   
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2.3 Equilibrium Relationships  
 
We start by describing the allocation of workers across sectors. We assume that adult 
workers are mobile across sectors and, thus, should they fail to find employment in the 
formal modern sector at the minimum wage, they offer their services in the informal 
(modern plus agrarian) sectors at the market clearing wage. Child workers can find 
employment only in the informal sectors.  
 
The demand for labour by formal-sector firms,
D
F L , is induced by the demand for the 
high-quality varieties registered by two groups of households. First, the proportion of 








), and second, 
by the landowning households. Thus,  
F F F
D













  .                                                                                      (17) 
The demand for labour (in effective units) by informal firms in the modern sector is 
induced  by  the  consumption  of  the  low-quality  variety  of  the  VDP  by  households 
(working)  in  both  the  formal  and  informal  sectors.  The  number  of  formal-sector 








. The number of 
informal and agrarian households is equal to F LL  , where L is the total number of 
households (and also equal to adult labour supply). Thus, the demand for labour in 
effective  units  by  low-quality  producers  of  the  VDP  is  equal  to, 
  IN F IN F
D














 .                                                                  (18) 
The demand for labour by the agrarian sector,
D
A L , is (implicitly) defined by equation (3). 
Under  the  assumptions  of  inter-sectoral  labour  mobility  and  perfect  substitutability 
between adult and child workers, the wage (per effective unit of labour) in the informal 
sector  is  determined  by  the  requirement  that  the  number  of  effective  labour  units 
demanded in the informal and agrarian sectors are equal to the relevant labour supply. 
The latter is equal to the sum of the number of households not employed in the formal   19 
sector (= F LL  ), plus the supply of children in effective units (=    1 F b s L L  ).  
Thus, labour-market clearing obtains if,  
   ( ) 1
D D D
F IN A F F L L L L L b s L L        .                                                                (19) 
Assuming that households always prefer to find employment in the formal sector so 
that
D
FF LL  , equation (19) can be equivalently written as, 
   1
D D D
F IN A F L L L L b s L L       .                                                                           (20)  
Equation (20) just states that the economy-wide demand of effective labour units is 
equal to their supply; substituting equations (17) and (18) into this equation, we can 
write the condition for labour market equilibrium as,  





F F F F IN F IN A F L Q TQ L Q L L Q L L b s L L
  

    
                 
 .    (21) 
Using similar reasoning, we can write the aggregate demand for the agrarian good as 
the sum of the corresponding demands of the four types of households in our model. 
These are the formal-sector households consuming the high-quality VDP, the formal-
sector households consuming the low-quality VDP, the households earning the informal 
wage  (informal  plus  agrarian  households),  and  the  landowning  households.  Using 
equation (2), we get the market- clearing equation for the homogeneous good:  
 
   





M M F F M IN IN F
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BL







    
             
 
         
             
(22) 
Equations  (3),  (15),  (21),  and  (22)  solve  (implicitly)  for  the  endogenous  variables
*, IN W  , , FA LL . These variables can in turn be used along with the rest of the equations 
to determine the allocation of labour across sectors, the size of child employment, and 
the welfare achieved by each member of the various household groups. 
 
3. Policy Analysis 
 
In this section we discuss the effects of changes in the institutional/policy environment 
on the incidence of child labour, the size of the (in)formal sector, and welfare. We 
assume throughout that the (exogenous) changes considered are small so as to ensure 
that the induced changes in the market-clearing wage paid to informal-sector workers   20 
(modern plus agrarian) do not cause it to rise to the level of the minimum wage. We 
also evaluate changes in the welfare of different types of households without taking into 
account the non-pecuniary effects arising from changes in the supply of child labour. 
The proofs for our results are provided in the Appendix. 
 
3.1 Stricter Enforcement of Child Labour Regulation.  
We consider an increase in CLR, which, in our model is captured by an increase in 
parameter s. This causes an immediate decrease in child labor supply (=   F L L s   1 ), 
and  as  a  result  the  market-clearing  wage  paid  by  informal  employers  in  both  the 
modern and agrarian sectors increases. The effect of this increase is a rise in the cost of 
producing (= IN INQ W ) the low-quality variety of the VDP in the informal sector. The 
resulting  rise  in  the  price  of  the  informally-produced  variety  induces  some  of  the 
households initially working in the formal sector to switch their demand towards the 
high-quality variety (i.e., θ* falls). The increased demand for the high-quality variety 
will  induce  a  rise  in  formal-sector  employment  (and  in  the  number  of  households 
earning the minimum wage), thus resulting in a decrease in employment in the informal 
sectors (modern and agrarian).This reallocation of economic activity away from the 
informal sectors will reduce the number of households sending their children to work, 
thus reinforcing the initial reduction in the supply of child labour.
11 We summarize the 
effects of stricter CLR (s ) in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Stricter enforcement of CLR results in an expansion of formal economic 
activity, a rise in the market-clearing wage ( IN W ), a decline in the incidence of child 
labour, and in the size of the informal sectors. It also leads to: a welfare decrease for 
formal-sector households who continue to consume the low-quality variety, as well as 
for  the landowning  households; an increase in welfare of  households  shifting from 
informal to formal employment; no change in the welfare of formal-sector households 
who continue to consume the high-quality variety; an ambiguous effect on the welfare 
of households remaining in the informal sectors.  
 
                                                 
11This effect is similar to the one derived by Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007) when considering the case of 
a complete ban on child labour.   21 
The effects on the welfare of various groups follow directly from the changes in  IN W  
and in the price of the low-quality variety.  The rise in the price of the low-quality 
variety  makes  those  minimum-wage  earning  households  which  either  still  prefer  to 
consume the low-quality variety, or have been induced by the price rise to switch their 
demand to the high-quality variety worse-off. This is shown in Figure 2 for two such 
households. The initial situation, before the rise in s, has both households achieving 
higher utility by consuming the low-quality variety, i.e., they prefer point 1 over point 2. 
The rise in the price of the low-quality variety makes the feasible budget point shift to 
point 3 if the household is to buy the low-quality variety, but preserves point 2 as a 
feasible consumption bundle. Faced with this shrinkage of ―real income‖, household a 
(the one with the steeper indifference map) chooses to switch his consumption towards 
the high-quality variety at point 2; in contrast, household b finds it optimal to continue 
consuming the informal-sector variety and shifts to point 3.In both cases the households 
suffer a drop in welfare.
12 
 
Figure 2: Response of minimum wage households to a rise in s  
                                                 
12We note that the shift to consuming the more ―luxurious‖ formal-sector variety is not associated with 
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The effects on welfare of the other groups of households can be visualized in a similar 
manner. We note that the ambiguous effect on the welfare of households remaining in 
the informal sectors after the rise in s, despite the increase in wages, is due to the fall in 
the effective labour units supplied by each household. 
 
The  ambiguous  influence  on  the  welfare  of  different  households  identified  above 
provides  a  cautionary  tale  of  policies  which  achieve  their  stated  objectives,  e.g. 
reduction in child labour and in the size of the informal sector, but may be welfare 
reducing  for  large  parts  of  the  population.  It  also  explains  also  why  a  stricter 
enforcement  of  CLR  does  not  receive  widespread  support  in  many  developing 
countries,
13 and why some countries have supplemented their campaigns against child 
labour with various (cash or non -cash) transfer programs in order to garner political 
support among low-income households for these initiatives.
14 
 
3.2 Increase in minimum wage 
The policy choice of minimum wage regulation as a policy lever with regard to child 
labour has been suggested as a more realistic and feasible policy instrument compared 
with the case of a full ban for developing economies given that ―…..a direct ban on 
child labor is very difficult to implement. And though adult minimum wages are also 
hard to implement, most countries have such legislation already in place and some 
mechanism for implementing‖ (Basu, 2000).  
 
In our set up the coverage of minimum wage legislation is limited to adult workers 
employed  in  the  formal  sector.  Consider  the  effect  of  an  increase  in  the  (binding) 
minimum wage  M W  on the proportion of formal-sector households which choose to buy 
the high-quality variety. The partial equilibrium effect (i.e. ignoring the effects on the 
market clearing wage) can be found from equation (15). This equation implies that,  
                                                 
13This is consistent with Hatipoglu and Ozbek‘s (2011) finding that the presence of an informal sector 
places severe limits on the political feasibility of large scale redistribution.   
14 Given the strained public finances of many developing countries, the U.N. World Food Program is a 
very important endeavour in this respect. This i nitiative runs a model foreign aid effort called the 
school feeding program, and it offers free meals to children in poor schools (and an extra bribe of grain 
for girl students to take home to their families). 
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 
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.                                                                                  (23) 
We find that the effect is ambiguous; a –ceteris paribus- increase in the minimum wage 
may either increase, or reduce, the proportion of formal-sector households consuming 
the high-quality variety. This ambiguity results from the influence of two forces: The 
first one can be termed the ―substitution effect‖, and it arises because the increase in the 
minimum  wage raises the (relative) cost  and price of the high-quality variety, thus 
inducing households to switch their demand towards the informally-produced variety. 
The second can be termed the ―income effect‖, and it arises because the increase in the 
minimum wage results in an increase in the real income of formal-sector households, 
thus inducing them to spend more on the VDP – i.e., to switch their demand towards the 
high-quality  variety.  The  higher  is  parameter  F  (which  measures  the  ―cost  of 
formality‖),  the  more  likely  it  becomes  that  the  income  effect  will  prevail.  This  is 
because the higher is F, the lower is the proportional rise in the (cost) price of the high-
quality variety as a result of the rise in  M W , and thus the smaller the influence of the 
substitution effect and the larger the influence of the income effect. 
 
Although we have no direct evidence about the size of F, we note that F can also be 
interpreted as the proportion of non-wage costs in total costs per physical unit of the 
VDP since    F M F AC Q W Q F  . Under this interpretation, in developed economies F 
is usually larger than the (direct) wage costs, i.e.  MF F W Q  . In what follows we shall 
assume a significantly weaker condition regarding the relative size of F; we assume
  1 F IN IN F Q Q W  .This assumption ensures that a rise in  M W  results in a rise in the 
proportion of formal-sector households consuming the high-quality variety. Provided 
this assumption holds we can summarize the effects of a rise in the minimum wage with 
the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. A rise in the minimum wage results in a rise in formal economic activity, 
a rise in the market-clearing wage, and a decline in child employment. It can also lead 
to a rise in the welfare of all working households, whereas land-owning households 
suffer a welfare decline. 
   24 
The expansion of formal-sector employment as a result of the rise in  M W  is due to the 
possibility that the income effect of the wage rise is stronger than the substitution effect, 
thus inducing a larger fraction of formal-sector households to consume the high-quality 
variety of the VDP. This income effect is absent in the analysis of Basu (2000), where a 
rise in the minimum wage can reduce adult employment, thus forcing the household to 
send the children to work. In our model, the increased demand for the variety produced 
in the formal sector, results in an increase in formal-sector employment and a rise in the 
number of households that can afford not to send their children to work.  
 
The increase in formal sector employment impacts negatively on the available labour 
supply  in  the  other  two  sectors  (=       s b L L F    1 1 ),  thereby  generating  an 
increase in the market-clearing wage similar to the one caused by the increased CLR 
examined earlier.
15 Our framework thus provides a particular channel in support of the 
lighthouse effect of minimum wages on the informal wage and their positive impact 
on the reduction of child labour.
16Empirical evidence in support of this prediction has 
been provided by Fajnzylber (2001) and Lemos (2004)  for Brazil, and Jones (1997) 
for Ghana. Maloney and Nunez (2003), in particular, found that in Mexico, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Honduras and Colombia ‖the influence of the minimum wage 
appears is more significant in the informal sector than in the formal sector‖. 
 
An increase in minimum wage in our framework not only it succeeds in reducing child 
employment, but it may also be more likely to pass the test of political feasibility since 
with the exception of landowners all other households may gain from it. 
 
3.3 Increase in agrarian labor productivity  
 
In specific-factors models, the typical consequence from an (exogenous) increase in 
labour productivity of one sector is the expansion in the employment of this sector and 
                                                 
15What prevents policymakers in our model from eliminating informality totally (in the modern sector) 
by  continuing  to  increase  the  minimum  wage?  Apart  from  political  economy  considerations  (e.g. 
landlords may have the political power to prevent such wage increases), our model suggests that as 
wages keep increasing, the condition     1 F IN IN F Q Q W  , will no longer be satisfied, and thus 
further minimum wage increases will be counter-productive (in the sense of decreasing formal-sector 
employment and increasing child labour). 
16The term lighthouse effect (EfeitoFarol) was introduced in the literature by Souza and Baltar (1980).   25 
the contraction of employment in the other sector; e.g. due to a rise in agrarian labour 
productivity, there would be a decline in manufacturing employment. This is not the 
case in our framework. Instead, the rise in agrarian labour productivity  leads to an 
increase  in  the  market-clearing  wage  rate,  and  raises  the  price  of  the  informally-
produced,  low-quality  variety  of  the  VDP.  As  a  result,  some  minimum-wage 
households will switch their demand towards the high-quality variety, thus engendering 
a rise in formal-sector employment. The decline in informal employment will in turn 
lead  to  a  fall  in  child  employment.  We  thus  reach  the  paradoxical  result  that 
improvements in the productive capacity of a sector employing child labour can cause a 
decline in the economy-wide incidence of child labour. 
 
The rise in agrarian labour productivity does not benefit all households. Minimum-
wage earning households who were previously consuming the low-quality variety will 
suffer a reduction in welfare (even if they switch their demand towards the high-quality 
variety after the rise in the cost of the low-quality variety). Landowners may also suffer 
a decline in their welfare, since in addition to the rise in the (real) wage paid to the 
workers, agricultural employment (in effective units) will also fall. The latter change is 
a  consequence  of  the  fact  that  not  only  the  production  of  more  high-quality  units 
requires more workers than those released from the production of low-quality varieties, 
but also due to the decline of child labour caused by the reduction of adult employment 
in the informal sectors.  
 
Does this conclusion imply that landowners would block any government efforts to 
boost the productivity of the agrarian sector though spending on agricultural research or 
infrastructure projects? We regard it as unlikely that landowners will ―see through‖ the 
possible general equilibrium effects of government efforts to boost the productivity of 
the agrarian sector will have on their incomes. Moreover, given the beneficial effects on 
other groups of households, such a government initiative may be politically feasible. In 
addition, the government could, in principle, use its efforts to support other types of 
activities which directly benefit the formal sector, e.g. by embarking on policies which 
decrease the cost of formality (a decrease in F). Since it is evident that such policies   26 
constitute a direct method to eliminate some of the sources of informality and reduce 
child labour, we abstain from further discussion of this issue.
17 
 
3.4 Decrease in population (labour supply)  
 
The effects of decreases in labour supply in our framework can be captured through a 
decrease in the number of working households, L, thus producing an equi-proportionate 
decrease in the supply of effective labour units. (We may also think that this comes 
about through emigration, provided that the new households consist also of one adult 
and of one child; this is similar to the migration pattern considered by Dinopoulos and 
Zhao (2006).) Given the assumption of diminishing returns in the agrarian sector, the 
diminished supply of labour will result in an increase in the market-clearing wage, 
which in turn will increase the price of the informally-produced, low-quality variety. 
This  will  induce  some  of  the  minimum-wage  earning  households  to  switch  their 
demand towards the high-quality variety, thus increasing employment in the formal 
sector,  and  decreasing  the  employment  of  both  adults  and  children  in  the  informal 
sectors. As a result, the fall in adult and child employment in the informal sectors will 
be larger than the decrease in labour supply, thus decreasing the share of the informal 
sectors in the economy. The consequence of these changes is an increase in the absolute 
size of formal- sector employment as aggregate employment contracts. This outcome is 
in contrast with Dinopoulos and Zhao (2006) who find that ―… emigration of unskilled 
labour can indeed exasperate the problem of child labour by increasing the demand for 
working children‖.  
 
Our framework suggests that for countries which receive migrant workers, and in which 
child labour and the informal sector are integral parts of the economy, immigration will 
increase  both  informality  and  the  incidence  of  child  labour.    The  experience  of 
Turkey
18during the last two decades provides an example which is not at variance with 
                                                 
17We note also that since the  cost of formality partly consists of taxes that generate revenue  who 
finance vital government spending, it may not be sensible to rely on tax cuts to reduce F. It is clear that 
a proper treatment of this issue requires that full consideration to the tax structure and the government 
budget  constraint  is  given.  Moreover,  one  should  also  consider  whether  issues  of  bureaucratic 
inefficiency  are  simply  a  matter  of  lack  of  the  appropriate  organizational  capabilities,  and  not  a 
conscious effort of rent-seeking groups to thwart the state‘s build-up of administrative capabilities.    
18Traditionally (i.e., since the 1950s)  Turkey has been known as a countr y of emigration. However, 
recently, Turkey has also become known as a country of transit to the European Union for irregular 
migrants from Asian countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. Turkey has   27 
this  prediction;  informality  in  the  urban  sectors  –  the  main  recipients  of  illegal 




The welfare effects of changes in labour supply on landowners and formal -sector 
households which consume the low -quality variety of the  VDP  are straightforward: 
increases in labour supply decrease the market-clearing wage and affect positively the 
welfare of these groups. By analogy, all households which are working in the informal 
sector will be worse off.  Finally, the welfare of households which continue to consume 
the high-quality variety remains unchanged. These effects suggest that the policies of 
countries which are net recipients of migrants will be sensitive to small changes in the 




The model of this paper has highlighted some links between the structure of product 
demand, relative wages, and the allocation of economic activity across the formal and 
informal sectors. These inter-connections have brought to light possible consequences 
of  some  widely  discussed  policy  interventions,  such  as  stricter  enforcement  of 
regulations on child labour and minimum wage increases. For example, minimum wage 
increases for formal-sector workers result in a reduction in child employment and a rise 
in  the  (market-clearing)  informal  wage  rate.  The  paper  has  also  shown  that  the 
beneficial effects of stricter child-labour regulation and minimum wage increases as far 
as child labour and informality are concerned, may not be enough to guarantee the 
required political support for their implementation.  
The paper has used some stark assumptions in order to increase the transparency of the 
results. For example, the assumption that there is only one quality level produced by 
informal  firms  and  one  produced  by  formal  firms  could  be  easily  relaxed  without 
affecting the substance of our findings; it would still be true that some households 
                                                                                                                                            
also become a destination for irregular migrants from former Soviet Bloc countries, and the sum of 
legal and illegal immigration flow to the country is estimated to be larger than the total number of 
emigrants.  
19We have no direct evidence about the change in child employment during the  same period, although 
indirect evidence (from various countries) suggests (Perry et al., 2007) that the size of the informal 
economy and child employment are positively correlated.    28 
would  find  it  in  their  interest  to  switch  their  consumption  from  formal-sector  to 
informal-sector varieties of the vertically differentiated product (or vice versa). The 
same also holds true for the production function of the agrarian good – any production 
function which displays diminishing returns would maintain the qualitative nature of 
our results. The model could also be interpreted as a small, open-economy one, with the 
agrarian  good  being  internationally  traded,  and  the  vertically-differentiated  product 
being  non-traded.  However,  allowing  for  (international)  trade  in  the  differentiated 
product would probably alter some of our findings since, e.g. minimum wage increases 
would squeeze the market share of domestic, formal-sector, firms as they face both the 
low-quality  domestic  rivals  (informal-sector  firms)  and  foreign  (possibly,  higher-
quality) rivals. An equally important extension would involve the introduction of the 
government budget constraint. This would allow for a proper analysis of how changes 
in the structure of taxation could be used to influence the influence the cost of formality 
and the allocation of economic activity across sectors.                     29 
 
Appendix 
The total differential of equations (5), (15), (20), and (21) can be written in matrix form 
as follows. The endogenous variables are
*
, ,, IN F A W L L  , while , M sW , B, and L are the 
exogenous variables. : 
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Let  D denote the determinant of the endogenous variables. Its value is:  
     
 
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         
    
   
 
where,  
          1 0
L
F F IN M IN IN F IN A A Log Q Log Q W W Q Log Q Log Q                        
(A.4)   30 
      2 1 2 1 10
HL
F F IN M IN IN M F IN IN A G A G A A W W W b s G W Q F W Q             (A.5)  
    11 10 F IN B G Q Q b s      
 
Given the above definitions, we can sign  D  once we take into account under what 
conditions the system is stable; i.e. the restrictions required so that increases in the 
market-clearing (informal) wage rate eliminate any excess demand for labour. Using 
equations  (5),  (15),  (20),  and  (21)  we  find  that  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the 
correspondence principle are:  
 
      1 1 1 0
LH
A F F F F A L L Q A A     
      
and
              1 1 1 0
LH
F IN F F F IN IN F IN F IN F M IN L Q A A L W Q Q Q L Q Q W W F            
 
Using these restrictions we find that D <0.  
 
Comparative Statics 
A.1 Stricter Enforcement of CLR (s) 
Using Cramer‘s rule we get:  
  Decrease in θ* (i.e. increase in the proportion of minimum-wage households  
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(A.8) 
where from (A.4) and (A.5)  1 0 A  and  2 0 A  respectively.  
  Increase in formal-sector employment LF:  0
F L F S dL
ds D
 ,  
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(A.9) 
  Increase in market-clearing wage WIN:  0
IN W IN S dW
ds D
 , 
          21 11
0
IN
F IN F IN IN
W
A
a b L L W A b s G Q Q W
S
L
                                  (A.10) 
  Decrease in agricultural sector employment LA: 0
A L A S dL
ds D
 ,      31 
        21 10
A L F F IN IN S b L L A b s G Q Q W                                
(A.11) 
 
Finally, by totally differentiating equation (17) we get, 
  Decrease informal sector employment  IN L : 
   
  .9 1 (1 ) 0
A IN IN F
F
dL dL dL
b s b L L
ds ds ds
                                                (A.12) 
 
Welfare effects 
  Decrease in landowner’s welfare  T U  
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  Decrease in formal household’s welfare which consumes the low quality good: 
Differentiating the utility function of the formal household who consumes the low-
quality  variety,   ln ln
L
F F F IN IN U Q W W Q    ,  we  get 
0
LL
IN IN IN IN IN FF
L
IN F M IN IN
dW Q dW Q dW dU dU
ds dW ds A ds W W Q ds
    






  No change in formal household’s welfare which consumes the high quality good: 
From differentiation of    ln ln
H




           (A.15) 
  Ambiguous effect on household’s welfare which consumes the low quality good: 
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A.2 Increase in minimum wage  
Using Cramer‘s rule we get:  
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(A.17) 
where from (A.3) and (A.4)  0
H
F M M F A W W Q F     and  1 0 A  respectively 
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Welfare effects  
  Decrease in landowner’s welfare  T U  
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  Ambiguous effect on formal household’s welfare if it consumes the low quality good  
1
L L L
IN IN F F F F
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                                                                                         (A.23) 
  Increase in informal household’s welfare which consumes the low quality good  
1
0
IN IN IN IN
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A3. Increase in agricultural labor productivity (B) 
Using Cramer‘s rule we get:  


















      
                                      
(A.25) 
  Increase in employment in formal sector  F L :  0
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(A.26) 
  Decrease in agricultural sector employment  A L :  0
A L A B dL
dB D
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(A.27) 
  Increase in market clearing wage IN W :  0
IN W IN B dW
dB D
  
Where        21 1
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Welfare issues 
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  Decrease in formal household’s welfare in case it consumes the low quality good    34 
0
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  No change in formal household’s welfare in case it consumes the high quality good  
  ln ln
H




                                            (A.31) 
  Increase in informal household’s welfare which consumes the low quality good  IN U  
1
0
IN IN IN IN
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A4. Increase in labor supply (L)  
Using Cramer‘s rule we get:  
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  Decrease in formal sector employment F L :  0
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  Increase in agricultural sector employment A L :  0
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(A.35) 
  Decrease in market clearing  IN W :  0
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  
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Welfare issues 
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  Increase informal household’s welfare in case it consumes the low quality good    35 
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  No change in formal household’s welfare in case it consumes the high quality good  
  ln ln
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                                                           (A.38) 
  Decrease in informal household’s welfare which consumes the low quality good 
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